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Abstract
This work studied the score-based black-box adversarial attack problem, where
only a continuous score is returned for each query, while the structure and pa-
rameters of the attacked model are unknown. A promising approach to solve this
problem is evolution strategies (ES), which introduces a search distribution to
sample perturbations that are likely to be adversarial. Gaussian distribution is
widely adopted as the search distribution in the standard ES algorithm. However, it
may not be flexible enough to capture the diverse distributions of adversarial per-
turbations around different benign examples. In this work, we propose to transform
the Gaussian-distributed variable to another space through a conditional flow-based
model, to enhance the capability and flexibility of capturing the intrinsic distribu-
tion of adversarial perturbations conditioned on the benign example. Besides, to
further enhance the query efficiency, we propose to pre-train the conditional flow
model based on some white-box surrogate models, utilizing the transferability of
adversarial perturbations across different models, which has been widely observed
in the literature of adversarial examples. Consequently, the proposed method could
take advantages of both query-based and transfer-based attack methods, to achieve
satisfied attack performance on both effectiveness and efficiency. Extensive experi-
ments of attacking four target models on CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImageNet verify the
superior performance of the proposed method to state-of-the-art methods.
1 Introduction
It has been well known [2, 13] that adversarial examples are the serious threat to deep neural networks.
Although massive attack methods have been developed, most of them assume that all information of
the attacked model is accessible, such that the gradient can be easily computed to generate adversarial
perturbations, which is called white-box adversarial attack. However, a more practical setting in
real world scenarios is that the structure and parameters of the attacked model is inaccessible to the
attacker, while only the feedback of each query is provided, which is called black-box adversarial
attack. Further, if the feedback is only the discrete label, then it is dubbed decision-based black-box
attack; if the feedback is the continuous score (e.g., the posterior probability w.r.t. each class), then it
is dubbed score-based black-box attack, which is also the focus of this work.
The score-based black-box attack can be formulated as a derivative-free optimization problem. A
promising derivative-free optimization approach is evolution strategies (ES) [38]. The core idea
of the ES-based black-box attack is introducing a search distribution to model the distribution of
adversarial perturbations. Given the search distribution, several perturbations are sampled to obtain
new queries to the attacked model; then, the query feedbacks are adopted to update the search
distribution to get better values of the black-box objective function. The Gaussian distribution is
widely used as the search distribution in many ES methods [44, 40, 17]. However, we don’t think
*This work was done when Yan Feng was an intern at Tencent AI Lab. Correspondence to: Baoyuan Wu and
Shutao Xia.
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that the simple Gaussian distribution is a good choice for modeling the distribution of adversarial
perturbations. Because it ignores the close dependency between adversarial examples and benign
examples. Considering that even the loss landscapes around different benign examples are quite
diverse, it is difficult to imagine that the adversarial perturbations around different benign examples
could follow one identical distribution. A recent work in ES [12] proposed to transform the Gaussian-
distributed variable to another space through a reversible flow-based generative model, such that
the modeling capability for probabilistic distributions is enhanced. However, the flow-based model
doesn’t take into account the variation due to benign examples. Inspired by that work, we propose to
adopt a conditional generative flow model, called c-Glow, which is expected to be flexible enough to
capture the complex distribution of adversarial perturbations conditioned on diverse benign examples.
However, due to the additional parameters of c-Glow, it may require more queries to learn a good
approximation of the distribution of adversarial perturbations, while the query is the main cost in
the black-box attack. To accelerate the attack efficiency, we propose to pre-train the c-Glow model
based on some white-box surrogate models, according to the observation [33, 34, 28] that adversarial
examples generated for one model may also be adversarial for another model, dubbed adversarial
transferability. Specifically, we propose to minimize the K-L divergence between the c-Glow model
and the energy-based model w.r.t. the adversarial loss, based on surrogate models. Consequently, the
proposed method utilizes the advantages from both query-based and transfer-based attack methods,
with the expectation to achieve high adversarial success rate and high attack efficiency simultaneously.
The main contributions of this work are three-fold. 1) We propose to utilize the conditional Glow
model coupled with Gaussian as the search distribution in the ES algorithm for solving the score-
based black-box adversarial attack problem. 2) We propose to pre-train the c-Glow model via
approximating the energy-based model of the perturbation distribution of surrogate models. 3)
Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate the superiority of the proposed attack
method to several state-of-the-art methods.
2 Related Work
Here we only focus on black-box adversarial attack methods, which can be generally partitioned to
two categories, including decision-based and score-based adversarial attacks.
Decision-based Adversarial Attacks. For decision-based attacks, an attacker can only acquire
the output label of the target model. A boundary search method [3] randomly sampled candidate
perturbations following the normal distribution, and the perturbation with the lower objective is
updated as the new solution. An evolution based search method [10] utilized the history queries to
approximate a Gaussian distribution as the search distribution. [6] formulated the decision-based
attack problem as a continuous optimization by alternatively optimizing the perturbation magnitude
and perturbation direction. This method was further accelerated in [7] by only estimating the sign
of gradient. HopSkipJumpAttack [5] developed an iterative search algorithm by utilizing binary
information at the decision boundary to estimate the gradient. It is further improved in [26] by
learning a more representative subspace for perturbation sampling. Based on the observation of the
low curvature of the decision boundary around adversarial examples, [29] approximated the gradient
using the gradients of neighbour points; [35] locally approximated the decision boundary with a
hyper-plane, and searched the closest point on the hyper-plane to the benign input as the perturbation.
Score-based Adversarial Attacks. There are generally three sub-categories of score-based black-
box attacks, including transfer-based attack, query-based attack and their combination. 1) Transfer-
based methods attempt to generate adversarial perturbations utilizing the information of white-box
surrogate models. For example, [33] proposed to firstly train a white-box surrogate model with a
dataset labeled by querying the target model, then utilize the gradient of the trained surrogate model to
generate adversarial perturbations to attack the target model. [28] found that adversarial perturbations
generated on an ensemble of source models show good attack performance on the target model.
Although transfer-based attack methods are very efficient, the attack performance is often lower
than query-based attack methods. 2) Query-based methods solve the black-box optimization by
iteratively querying the target model. SimBA [14] randomly sampled a perturbation from a predefined
orthonormal basis, and then either added or subtracted this perturbation to the attacked image. [22]
utilized the natural evolution strategy (NES) [43, 44] method to minimize a continuous expectation of
the black-box objective function based on a search distribution. Bandit [23] improved the NES method
by incorporating data and temporal priors into the gradient estimation. SignHunter [1] adopted the
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gradient sign rather than the gradient as the search direction. Query-based methods often achieve
better attack performance than transfer-based methods, but require more queries. 3) Combination
methods try to take advantages of both transfer-based and query-based methods, to achieve high
attack success rate and high query efficiency simultaneously. The general idea is firstly learning some
types of priors from surrogate models, then incorporating these priors into the query-based method to
guide the attack procedure for the target model. For example, the prior used in N -Attack [27] is the
mean parameter of the search distribution in NES, which is learned using a regression neural network
trained based on surrogate models. Methods in [8] and [15] utilized the gradient of surrogate models
as the gradient prior. The TREMBA method [21] treated the projection from a low-dimensional space
to the original space as the prior, such that the perturbation could be search in the low-dimensional
space. The hybrid method [41] directly adopted adversarial examples from surrogate models as the
prior, but surrogate models could be updated using the returned prediction by the target model. The
proposed method also belongs to this type, but the prior we adopted is the perturbation distribution.
3 Score-based Black-box Adversarial Attack
3.1 Problem Formulation
We denote a classification model F : X → Y , with X being the input space, n = |X | indicating the
dimension of the input space, and Y being the output space, Given a benign example x ∈ X and
its ground-truth label y ∈ Y , F(x, y) indicates the classification score w.r.t. the y-th label. In this
work, we adopt the logit as the classification score. The goal of adversarial attack is finding a small
perturbation η within a `p-ball, i.e., B = {η|η ∈ Rn, ‖η‖p ≤ } ( > 0 being a attacker defined
scalar, which will be specified in experiments), such that the prediction of x+ η is different with the
prediction of x. Specifically, the untargeted attack problem is formulated as
min
η
Luadv(η,x, y) = max
(
0,F(x+ η, y)−max
j 6=y
F(x+ η, j)
)
+ δ
(
η ∈ B
)
, (1)
where δ(a) = 0 if a is true, otherwise δ(a) = +∞. The targeted attack problem is formulated as
min
η
Ltaradv(η,x, t) = max
(
0,max
j 6=t
F(x+ η, j)−F(x+ η, t)
)
+ δ
(
η ∈ B
)
. (2)
Note that both Luadv(η,x, y) and Ltaradv(η,x, t) are non-negative. If 0 is achieved, then the corre-
sponding η is a successful adversarial perturbation. For clarity, hereafter we use Ladv(η,x) to
represent the untargeted or targeted attack when there is no need to distinguish between them.
In the case of score-based black-box adversarial attacks, the structure and parameters of the attacked
model F is inaccessible to the attacker, while only the output score F(x, y) is returned for each
query x. Consequently, the gradient of the attack objective Ladv w.r.t. the perturbation η cannot be
directly computed, which is the main challenge of black-box adversarial attacks.
Algorithm 1 Evolution strategies for score-based black-box adversarial attacks
input: The black-box attack objective Ladv(·,x), benign input x, the ground-truth label y or the target label t,
search distribution pi, population size k.
repeat
(Sampling): sample k perturbations η1, ...,ηk ∼ pi
(Evaluation): evaluate Ladv(η1,x), ...,Ladv(ηk,x)
(Update): update pi to increase the probability of producing perturbations of potentially better
objective values, i.e., lower Ladv(·,x)
until converge
3.2 Evolutionary Strategies for Adversarial Attacks
One promising approach for the black-box optimization is evolutionary strategies (ES) [36]. The main
idea is introducing a search distribution pi to sample some perturbations η to obtain the better values
of the black-box objective function, i.e., the smaller Ladv in the score-based black-box adversarial
attack problem. The general procedure of ES for the score-based black-box adversarial attack problem
is summarized in Algorithm 1. Many variants of ES have been developed, such as natural ES (NES)
3
[43, 44], co-variance matrix adaptation ES (CMA-ES) [17], self-adaptation ES (SA-ES) [18, 38], etc.
The main difference among these variants is the update step of the search distribution pi. Among
these variants, CMA-ES has been considered as one of the state-of-the-art variants in ES, especially
for the optimization problem in high-dimensional space.
The basic idea of CMA-ES is to update the parameters of pi by maximizing the weighted average
of log-likelihoods
∑m
i=1 wi logPpi(ηi:k), where logPpi(η) denotes the log-likelihood of η from the
distribution pi, where m,wi,ηi:k will be defined soon later. Consequently, it is more likely to sample
perturbations of better values of the objective function, i.e., lower values of Ladv(·,x). The search
distribution pi used in CMA-ES is set to Gaussian, i.e., pi := N (µ, σ2 · C). Specifically, given the
Sampling and Evaluation step in Algorithm 1, the Update step consists the following sequential parts:
• Update µ:
µ′ = µ, µ←
m∑
i=1
wi · ηi:k, (3)
where ηi:k indicates the i-th best perturbation out of k sampled perturbations, i.e., Ladv(η1:k,x) ≤
Ladv(η2:k,x) ≤ . . .Ladv(ηk:k,x), and m ≤ k,
∑m
i=1 wi = 1 are hyper-parameters.
• Update σ: pσ ← (1− cσ)pσ +
√
cσ(2− cσ)µeff C− 12 (µ−µ
′
σ ),
σ ← σ × exp
(
cσ
dσ
(
‖pσ‖
E‖N(0,I)‖ − 1
))
,
(4)
where E‖N (0, I) ‖ = √2Γ(n+12 )/Γ(n2 ) with Γ(·) being the gamma function [9].
• Update C: 
pc ← (1− cσ)pc + hσ
√
cc(2− cc)µeff(µ−µ
′
σ ),
w¯i = wi × (1 if wi ≥ 0 else k/‖C− 12 (µ−µ
′
σ )‖2),
C ← C + c1pcp>c + cµ
m∑
i=1
w¯i(
µ−µ′
σ )(
µ−µ′
σ )
>.
(5)
We refer the readers to [17] for the detailed meanings of pσ, pc, as well as the empirical settings of
all hyper-parameters (m,wi=1,...,m, µeff, dσ, cσ, cµ, cc, c1). Furthermore, to reduce the number of
parameters, we simply adopt the diagonal co-variance matrix C, such that the search distribution can
be represented as pi := N (µ, diag(σ2)) with σ2 = [σ21 ;σ22 ; . . . ;σ2n].
4 Conditional Flow-based Models as the Search Distribution
4.1 Conditional Glow Model
In most variants of ES, a simple distribution is adopted as the search distribution, such as Gaussian
distribution in CMA-ES. This simple setting has shown its effectiveness on solving many black-box
optimization problems. However, it may be unsuitable for the black-box adversarial attack problem.
Each adversarial perturbation is dependent on its corresponding benign example. Considering the
diversity of benign examples, Gaussian distribution may not be capable and flexible enough to
approximate the complex perturbation distributions conditioned on different benign examples.
The c-Glow Model. Inspired by the recent development in the literature of evolution strategies [12],
we propose to replace the widely used Gaussian distribution by conditional generative flow models
coupled with a Gaussian distribution as the search distribution pi. Specifically, we adopt the one
recently proposed model, dubbed the conditional Glow (c-Glow) model [30]. It can be formulated as
an inverse function gx,φ : z → η, and there exists g−1x,φ : η → z. φ indicates the model parameter;
the condition variable x corresponds to the benign example; z ∈ R|X | is a latent variable following a
simple distribution (specified later); η ∈ R|X | represents the perturbation variable. Further, gφ,x can
be decomposed to the composition of M inverse functions, as follows:
η = gx,φ(z) = gx,φ1(gx,φ2(...(gx,φM (z))...)), (6)
where φ = (φ1, . . . ,φM ), and φi indicates the parameter of gx,φi(·). Note that each function can
be implemented by a transformation layer. Then, the c-Glow model can be represented by a neural
network with M layers, and we set M = 3. Each layer consists of a conditional actnorm module,
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followed by an conditional 1× 1 convolutional module and a conditional coupling module. Due to
the space limit, the detailed definition of gx,φi(·) will be presented in the supplementary material.
Conditional Distribution with the c-Glow Model. If z = µ+ σ  z0 with z0 ∼ N (0, I), where
 is the entry-wise product and I indicates the identity matrix, utilizing the change of variables [42]
of Eq. (6), then the conditional likelihood of η is formulated as
logPθ(η|x) = logP0,1(z0) +
M+1∑
i=1
log
∣∣∣∣det(∂g−1x,φi(ri−1)∂ri−1
)∣∣∣∣, (7)
where θ = (φ,µ,σ), ri = g−1φi,x(ri−1), r0 = η, rM = z and rM+1 = z0. det(·) indicates the
determinant of a matrix. P0,1(·) indicates the probability density function of the multi-variant normal
distribution N (0, I). Note that in the above equation, for simplicity, we treat the transformation
z = µ + σ  z0 as the M + 1 layer of the c-Glow model, i.e., gx,φM+1(z0) = µ + δ  z0 with
φM+1 = (µ, δ), which is also invertible and independent with x. Thus, we also have η = gx,θ(z0).
Parameter Learning. Consequently, we have pi := Pθ(η|x). Compared to N (µ, diag(σ2)), this
new search distribution Pθ(η|x) is not only more capable to model the perturbation distribution due
to the projection from the c-Glow model, but also more flexible for different benign examples due
to its dependency on x. However, in order to unleash these potential advantages, a good c-Glow
model is required. Similar to [12], one feasible approach is to alternatively update (µ,σ) and φ
when maximizing the weighted average of log-likelihoods in the update step of CMA-ES (see Section
3.2). However, it may require more queries to achieve good states of φ. Instead, we adopt a simple
approach with two sequential steps, including: 1) firstly pre-training the c-Glow model (including
both (µ,σ) and φ) in a different way (specified in the next sub-section); 2) given the pre-trained
mapping parameter φ, optimizing (µ,σ) using the standard CMA-ES algorithm (see Section 3.2).
4.2 Pre-training the c-Glow Model using Surrogate Models
4.2.1 Modeling the Perturbation Distribution via Energy-Based Models
Given a surrogate model Fs : X → Y with the same input and output space with the target model
F , we can adopt any off-the-shelf white-box adversarial attack method to generate adversarial
perturbations. The adversarial loss of the untargeted attack is formulated as follows
Luadv,s(η,x, y) = max
(
Fs(x+ η, y)−max
j 6=y
Fs(x+ η, j) + ξ, 0
)
+ δ
(
η ∈ B
)
, (8)
where the slack variable ξ ≥ 0 is introduced to enhance the flexibility (its value is specified in
experiments), and B has been defined in Eq. (1). Based on Luadv,s(η,x, y), we propose to utilize
the energy based model to define the distribution of the untargeted adversarial perturbation η around
the benign example (x, y), as follows:
Pus (η|x, y) =
exp
(− β · Luadv,s(η,x, y))∫
η∈B exp
(− β · Luadv,s(η,x, y))dη . (9)
Note that given Fs, the normalization term (i.e., the denominator) is an intractable constant. Thus,
we simply omit it hereafter, and set
logPus (η|x, y) ≈ −λ · Luadv,s(η,x, y), (10)
where β, λ are two positive hyper-parameters. Later, we will use Eq. (10) to train the c-Glow model,
and we only need to tune λ (see experiments). For the targeted attack of Fs, the adversarial loss
Ltaradv,s(η,x, t) (t is the target label), as well as the perturbation distribution Ptars (η|x, t), can be de-
fined similarly. They are not presented here for clarity. Hereafter, we will use Ladv,s(η,x),Ps(η|x)
to represent the adversarial loss and the perturbation distribution of Fs, respectively, if there is no
need to distinguish between untargeted and targeted attacks.
4.2.2 Training the c-Glow Model by Approximating the Perturbation Distribution
Recall the ES algorithm for adversarial attacks (see Algorithm 1), if the search distribution Pθ(η|x)
(see Eq. (7)) is exactly the perturbation distribution of the attacked model F , then the attack will
be very efficient. However, in the scenario of black-box attacks, it is infeasible to explicitly model
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the perturbation distribution of F like that of Fs, which requires a tremendous number of queries.
Although the c-Glow model is capable to capture the perturbation distribution ofF , it may require lots
of queries to achieve a good state of its parameters. Thus, we resort to the adversarial transferability
[33, 28, 34] that the adversarial example generated for one model may be also adversarial for another
model. Inspired by this observation, we assume that there is also somewhat similarity between the
perturbation distributions of different models. Thus, we propose to pre-train the c-Glow model by
minimizing the KL divergence [25] between Ps(η|x) and Pθ(η|x). Without loss of generality, here
we only consider one benign example x, then the training objective is formulated as
min
θ
L = EPs(η|x)
[
log
Ps(η|x)
Pθ(η|x)
]
. (11)
We adopt the gradient-based method to optimize this problem. The gradient of L w.r.t. θ is presented
in Theorem 1. Due to the space limit, the proof of Theorem 1 will be presented in the supplementary
material. Note that each term within the expectation in Eq. (12) is tractable, thus∇θL can be easily
computed. In practice, K instantiations of z0 are sampled from N (0, I), then ∇θL is empirically
estimated as the average value over these K instantiations. K will be specified in experiments.
Theorem 1. Utilizing the definition η = gx,θ(z0) and z0 ∼ N (0, I) (see Section 4.1), and defining
the term D(η,x) = log Ps(η|x)Pθ(η|x) , then the gradient of L w.r.t. θ is computed as follows
∇θL = −Ez0∼N (0,I)
[
expD(η,x) ·∇ηD(η,x)>
∣∣
η=gx,θ(z0)
· ∇θgx,θ(z0)
]
, (12)
= −Ez0∼N (0,I)
[
exp−λ·Ladv,s(η,x)
Pθ(η|x) · ∇ηD(η,x)
>∣∣
η=gx,θ(z0)
· ∇θgx,θ(z0)
]
,
where∇ηD(η,x) = ∇η
[− λ · Ladv,s(η,x)− logPθ(η|x) ].
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets and Evaluation Metrics. Following the setting in [11], we choose 1,000 images randomly
from the testing set of CIFAR-10 [24] and the validation set of Tiny-ImageNet [37] for evaluation,
respectively. For both datasets, we normalize the input to [0, 1] and set the maximum distortion
of adversarial images to  = 8/255. The maximum number of queries is set to 10,000 for both
untargeted and targeted attacks. As did in prior works [15, 31], we adopt the attack success rate (ASR),
the mean and median number of queries of successful attacks to evaluate the attack performance.
Target and Surrogate Models. We consider four target models: VGG-15 [39], ResNet-Preact-110
[19], DenseNet-BC-110 [20] and PyramidNet-110 [16]. The implementations of these models are
downloaded from a GitHub repository1. We conduct the standard training on the training set of each
dataset to obtain the checkpoints of these target models. The top-1 error rates of these four target
models are (7.29%, 6.47%, 4.69%, 3.92%) on the standard testing set of CIFAR-10, and (28.33%,
26.82%, 26.38%, 25.26%) on the standard validation set of Tiny-ImageNet, respectively. On each
dataset, when attacking one target model, we treat the other three as surrogate models. For clarity,
hereafter we use VGG, ResNet, DenseNet, PyramidNet to represent these target models.
Compared methods. Several state-of-the-art score-based black-box attack methods are compared,
including Bandits [23], SimBA [14], Subspace [15], P-RGF [8], TREMBA [21], MetaAttack [11]
and Signhunter [1]. All of them are implemented using the source codes provided by their authors.
Implementation Details. 1) Pre-training of the c-Glow model is conducted on the standard training
set of CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively. The adversarial loss Ladv,s(η,x) in Eq. (12)
is specified as the average of CW-L2 losses [4] w.r.t. three surrogate models, and ξ is set as 20.
We adopt the normalized gradient descent (NGD) [32] method to achieve the stable training. The
batch-size is set as 2 and the learning rate is 0.0002. We sample K = 32 instantiations of z0 for each
iteration of training. For finetuing the hyper-parameter λ, we randomly split 10% of the training set of
CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImageNet as validation set, and search λ within the range {10, 20, ..., 100}. The
fine-tuned values of λ are 20 for CIFAR-10 and 50 for Tiny-ImageNet. 2) The CMA-ES algorithm
is implemented using PyCMA2, with the population size k = 20 and the selection size m = 10. The
1https://github.com/hysts/pytorch_image_classification
2https://github.com/CMA-ES/pycma
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Table 1: Attack success rate (ASR %), mean and median number of queries of untargeted attack and
targeted attack (target class being 0) on CIFAR-10. The best and second-best values among methods
that achieve more than 90% ASR are highlighted in bold and underline, respectively.
Target Model→ ResNet DenseNet VGG PyramidNet
Attack Method ↓ ASR Mean Median ASR Mean Median ASR Mean Median ASR Mean Median
Untargeted
Attack
Bandits [23] 90.8 193.4 88.0 96.0 206.3 96.0 93.0 361.5 158.0 92.0 194.9 92.0
SimBA [14] 93.2 432.1 235.0 74.0 480.5 223.0 68.3 632.3 237.0 84.0 455.5 270.0
Subspace [15] 93.0 301.8 12.0 96.0 115.8 12.0 90.0 272.0 12.0 91.0 255.4 10.0
P-RGF [8] 92.2 121.8 62.0 99.6 111.7 62.0 96.8 176.4 62.0 98.2 135.8 62.0
TREMBA [21] 90.9 120.7 64.0 97.8 126.4 66.0 97.7 125.5 63.0 97.9 82.3 39.0
MetaAttack [11] 100.0 363.2 153.0 100.0 411.5 225.0 100.0 392.0 161.0 100.0 320.4 191.0
Signhunter [1] 100.0 135.1 47.0 99.8 213.8 119.0 93.3 244.3 102.0 97.5 161.9 69.0
CG-ES (Ours) 100.0 81.6 1.0 100.0 43.3 1.0 99.9 56.4 1.0 100.0 30.1 1.0
Targeted
Attack
Bandits [23] 72.6 3660.1 2812.0 80.0 4154.8 3842.0 83.4 3967.6 3860.0 77.8 4484.6 3876.0
SimBA [14] 100.0 940.0 885.0 100.0 838.8 777.0 99.5 1343.2 1210.0 100.0 865.8 779.0
Subspace [15] 78.0 2409.3 1630.0 94.0 1528.4 1012.0 67.0 2129.1 1366.0 80.0 2241.3 1586.0
P-RGF [8] 70.6 1020.8 390.0 77.1 1037.1 438.0 61.3 1083.9 360.0 50.3 1108.8 436.0
TREMBA [21] 91.2 1125.3 868.0 92.3 1123.4 879.0 96.5 1331.5 1142.0 98.1 1082.4 759.0
MetaAttack [11] 98.7 1953.3 1537.0 99.8 2013.7 1793.0 86.1 3045.6 2307.0 98.9 2054.6 1665.0
Signhunter [1] 100.0 894.1 657.0 100.0 826.9 679.0 99.7 1431.7 1121.0 100.0 1111.6 878.0
CG-ES (Ours) 99.9 696.4 421.0 100.0 787.1 621.0 98.8 861.1 581.0 98.9 651.2 461.0
mean µ is initialized using the pre-trained c-Glow model, while the co-variance matrix diag(σ2) is
initialized as the identity matrix I. All other hyper-parameters are set as default values in PyCMA.
5.2 Black-box Attack on CIFAR-10
Untargeted Attack. In this case, one attack is successful if the predicted class of the adversarial
example is different from the ground-truth label. The results are reported in the top half of Table 1. It
shows that the proposed CG-ES achieves 100% ASR on ResNet, DenseNet and PyramidNet, and
99.9% ASR on VGG, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our method. CG-ES is also very query-
efficient. The mean number of queries is the lowest under all four target models in Table 1. More
surprisingly, the median number of queries of CG-ES is just 1, which means that we successfully fool
the target model with just one query for more than 50% attacked images. It reveals that the c-Glow
model pre-trained on surrogate models is a good approximation to the perturbation distribution of the
target model. In contrast, the second-best median queries are obtained by Subspace [15], which are
more than 10x of ours, and with much lower ASR. The curves of the average ASR on all evaluation
images v.s. the query number are shown in Fig. 1. It clearly highlights the superiority of our CG-ES
method to all compared methods. Especially in the stage of low query numbers, CG-ES achieves
very high ASR efficiently.
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Figure 1: Attack success rate (ASR %) w.r.t. query numbers for untargeted attacks on CIFAR-10.
Targeted Attack. Following [21], we conduct targeted attacks with three target classes, including
0 (airplane), 4 (deer) and 9 (truck). When attacking for one target class, images with the same
ground-truth class are skipped. Due to space limit, we report the attack results of the target class 0 in
the bottom half of Table 1, and leave the results of the other two target classes in the supplementary
material. As shown in Table 1, our CG-ES method achieves at least 98.8% ASR on all target models.
Besides, the mean and median query numbers of CG-ES are significantly lower than that of all
compared methods, demonstrating its query efficiency. Signhunter [1] obtains a slightly higher ASR
than CG-ES on VGG (0.9% higher) and PyramidNet (1.1% higher), but with the cost of more than
1.6x query numbers.
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Table 2: Attack success rate (ASR %), mean and median number of queries of untargeted attack and
targeted attack (target class being 94) on Tiny-ImageNet. The best and second-best values among
methods that achieve more than 90% ASR are highlighted in bold and underline, respectively.
Target model→ ResNet DenseNet VGG PyramidNet
Attack Method ↓ ASR Mean Median ASR Mean Median ASR Mean Median ASR Mean Median
Untargeted
Attack
Bandits [23] 82.9 1846.6 168.0 77.6 2629.3 1194.0 81.8 2421.9 940.0 85.0 2508.1 1012.0
SimBA [14] 99.4 616.9 398.0 99.0 1571.0 1198.0 97.5 1597.4 1168.0 97.5 1071.9 849.0
Subspace [15] 78.6 642.0 6.0 86.9 778.4 10.0 81.4 975.9 10.0 83.3 856.7 10.0
P-RGF [8] 98.2 203.2 112.0 91.2 209.5 112.0 91.8 452.0 112.0 95.3 482.9 112.0
TREMBA [21] 99.1 139.3 41.0 98.1 221.2 81.0 98.8 273.5 61.0 99.0 211.3 21.0
MetaAttack [11] 92.9 765.4 387.0 93.5 679.3 317.0 64.2 1352.5 1027.0 79.6 1015.7 642.0
Signhunter [1] 100.0 146.2 58.0 100.0 383.5 156.0 100.0 316.4 113.0 100.0 178.8 68.0
CG-ES (Ours) 100.0 131.5 41.0 98.9 159.5 61.0 99.2 260.7 61.0 99.4 196.5 1.0
Targeted
Attack
Bandits [23] 47.4 5374.6 5592.0 41.7 6081.0 6476.0 44.2 5674.9 5910.0 47.8 4717.4 4582.0
SimBA [14] 100.0 3407.1 3184.0 92.9 6061.8 5687.0 91.6 6301.7 6020.0 93.0 3816.2 3622.0
Subspace [15] 47.0 5377.1 5256.0 42.0 3972.0 2268.0 41.2 5562.3 3982.0 47.8 4679.1 5412.0
P-RGF [8] 54.6 3160.8 3286.0 59.4 3359.2 3187.0 52.1 3874.6 3429.0 55.3 3451.7 2466.0
TREMBA [21] 74.3 3415.7 3014.0 81.2 3233.7 2972.0 77.3 3361.8 2978.0 73.2 3761.2 3320.0
MetaAttack [11] 60.5 6332.2 6145.0 61.3 5863.8 5561.0 58.8 5979.4 5345.0 45.3 5995.2 5763.0
Signhunter [1] 100.0 2617.6 2239.0 92.6 3645.2 3123.0 85.0 3123.1 2930.0 95.9 2784.1 2078.0
CG-ES (Ours) 100.0 2158.7 1761.0 92.0 3140.1 2801.0 82.3 3315.1 3098.0 96.0 2225.7 1581.0
5.3 Black-box Attack on Tiny-ImageNet
Untargeted Attack. The results are summarized in the top half of Table 2. It shows that CG-ES
performs better than compared methods at most cases. Specifically, when attacking the ResNet model,
CG-ES achieves the highest ASR with the lowest mean and median number of queries among all
methods. When attacking DenseNet, CG-ES achieves ASR of 98.9% with the lowest mean and
median number of queries. The Signhunter is slightly higher than ours in terms of ASR (1.1% higher),
but its mean and median number of queries are 2.4x of ours. In terms of VGG, CG-ES achieves the
second-highest ASR and the best values of both mean and median number of queries. In terms of
PyramidNet, CG-ES obtains the second-best values of both ASR and the mean number of queries,
while the median query is just 1. In contrast, the median number of queries of Signhunter is 68x of
ours. These comparisons demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method.
Targeted Attack. Similar to that on CIFAR-10, we also randomly select three target classes: 94
(jellyfish), 113 (fly) and 171 (chain). Due to space limit, we report the results of the target class 94
in the bottom half of Table 2, and leave other results in the supplementary material. As shown in
Table 2, our CG-ES is more effective and efficient than compared method at most cases. Specifically,
when attacking ResNet and PyramidNet, CG-ES obtains the best performance on ASR, the mean
and median number of queries. When attacking DenseNet, CG-ES also obtains the lowest mean and
median number of queries. Although SimBA obtains slightly higher ASR (0.9% higher) than ours,
its mean and median number of queries are about 1.9x of ours. For the target model VGG, CG-ES
achieves the second-best value of mean number of queries. Above results demonstrate the superior
performance of CG-ES.
5.4 Discussions
Summary of Above Comparisons. In all above results summarized in Tables 1-2, and there are 48
evaluation results in total. Among these results, our CG-ES method obtains 36 best and 6 second-best
results. It fully demonstrates the superior performance of CG-ES on both effectiveness and efficiency,
to all compared methods. Moreover, CG-ES always achieves the lowest median numbers of queries
(except the targeted attack on VGG of Tiny-ImageNet), and even 1 at 4 results. It reflects that the
search distribution pi is very close to the intrinsic perturbation distribution of the target model, due to
the powerful flexibility of the c-Glow model coupled with the Gaussian distribution, as well as the
good transferability of the c-Glow model pre-trained on surrogate models.
Supplementary Material. Due to the space limit, some important information will be presented in
the supplementary material, including: the detailed definition of the c-Glow model (see Section 4.1),
the proof of Theorem 1, additional results of targeted attacks on both CIFAR-10 and Tiny-ImageNet,
ablation studies about the effects of the c-Glow model and its initialization, as well as the empirical
verification of the energy-based model for capturing the perturbation distribution (see Section 4.2.1).
Future Extensions. 1) The main idea of our method is replacing the search distribution in ES using
the c-Glow model, while the ES algorithm is not influenced. Thus, our method is applicable to
any ES variant, such as NES [43, 44]. 2) As demonstrated in the last paragraph of Section 4.1, in
this work we simply fix the parameter φ of the c-Glow model as the pre-trained value, while only
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fine-tuning the Gaussian parameters (µ,σ). Although this simple setting has shown surprisingly
good performance, it is still interesting to explore what will happen if φ is also fine-tuned. It is
possible that the ASR could be further improved, as the search distribution φ is supposed to be more
close to the perturbation distribution of the target model. Above two extensions will be explored in
our future work.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a novel search distribution in the evolution strategy (ES) method for solving
the score-based black-box attack problem, based on the conditional Glow model coupled with the
Gaussian distribution. This novel search distribution is flexible to capture the intrinsic distribution of
adversarial perturbations conditioned on different benign examples. Besides, we proposed to pre-train
the c-Glow model by approximating an energy-based model for the perturbation distribution of
surrogate models. The pre-trained c-Glow model is then used as initialization in ES for attacking the
target model. Consequently, the proposed CG-ES method takes advantages of both query-based and
transfer-based attack methods, to obtain high attack success rate and high efficiency simultaneously.
Extensive experiments of attacking four models on two benchmark datasets have fully verified the
superior attack performance of the proposed method, compared to several state-of-the-art methods.
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